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EVIDENCE
RICHARD A. GONZALES* and NIKKI J. MANN**

INTRODUCTION

The survey year April 1985 to April 1986 was rather quiet with respect
to evidence issues. Although no landmark or seminal cases were decided,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals and Supreme Court ruled upon several
evidentiary issues that should prove instructive to trial practitioners in
presenting evidence. This survey will focus on a number of those cases,
with emphasis placed on the practical implications for the trial lawyer.
I. RELEVANCY
A. CharacterEvidence and Proofof Other Acts of Crimes in Criminal
Cases

Perhaps no area of the law of Evidence is fraught with greater uncertainty than is the admissibility of character evidence.' The dangers of
improper use of character evidence are compounded in criminal cases
where either purposeful or inadvertent references to the defendant's past
misconduct can have grave consequences.2
The general rule prohibiting the prosecution from introducing evidence
of the bad character of the accused stems not from the lack of probity of
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.A. University of New Mexico;
J.D. New York University.
**Member, Class of 1987, University of New Mexico School of Law; B.S. Ohio State University,
1974; M.A. Ohio State University, 1978.
i. The admissibility of character evidence is addressed in N.M.R. EvID. 11-404 (1986 Recomp.)
(The numbers of the Evidence Rules have changed since the date of these cases. The authors are
using the current numbering system). Generally speaking, character evidence is not admissible to
support the inference that a person acted in conformity with his character on a particular occasion.
The rule, however, is subject to exceptions for: (I) a criminal defendant; (2) a victim in a criminal
case; and (3) a witness whose credibility is under attack. Rule 11-404(b) sets forth examples of prior
conduct that may be proved for purposes other than to support the inference that a person acted in
conformity with his character, such as identity, State v. Aguirre, 84 N.M. 376, 503 P.2d 1154 (1972);
motive, State v. Gardner, 91 N.M. 302, 573 P.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1977); or absence of mistake or
common scheme or plan, State v. McCallum, 87 N.M. 459, 535 P.2d 1085 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
87 N.M. 457, 535 P.2d 1083 (1975).
2. Because references by the prosecution to a criminal defendant's bad character traits are likely
to evoke prejudicial responses on the part of the trier of fact which outweigh any appropriate probative
value, the universal rule has been to exclude such evidence unless the defendant chooses to prove
his innocence by offering evidence of his good character. See, e.g., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE,
§§ 186, 189 (3d ed. 1984); IA J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §57 (Tillers rev. 1983); State v. Rowell, 77
N.M. 124, 419 P.2d 966 (1966).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

such evidence, but from the potential for its misuse. Nevertheless, it is
not uncommon for such information to come to the attention of the jury
from a variety of sources. The prosecutor might elicit such testimony
from a witness either in the erroneous belief that it is admissible or for
the more sinister express purpose of improperly influencing the jury. Or
a prosecution witness might unexpectedly blurt out the evidence in response to an otherwise proper question. The defense will ordinarily object
to the testimony, and the court will admonish the jury to disregard it.
Unlike most other forms of irrelevant evidence, however, the defendant's
character hangs heavy in the courtroom air like a bad odor that cannot
be freshened.
Misguided prosecutorial zeal or inadequate witness preparation that
produces an improper reference to the defendant's bad character or past
misconduct is a recurrent problem in New Mexico courts. An earlier
survey article discussed three such cases decided by the court of appeals
in which a criminal defendant's prior criminal behavior had been elicited
during direct examination of a prosecution witness.3 Those cases suggest
that prosecutorial misconduct is an important factor in determining whether
the presentation of such evidence by the state constitutes grounds for
mistrial or reversible error. In other words, the court must determine
whether the prosecuting attorney purposefully elicited the evidence in an
effort to improperly prejudice the jury against the defendant. The court
of appeals decisions, taken together, seem to treat prosecutorial misconduct as a definitive factor in determining whether reversible error has
occurred. On the other hand, where the prejudicial evidence was produced
through inadvertence, misunderstanding, or inadequate witness preparation, various factors should be considered, such as the necessity for
resort to the evidence,4 the likelihood that the jury will follow an admonition by the court to disregard the evidence or to limit consideration
to its proper purpose, 5 or the overall strength of the state's case based
on properly admitted evidence.6
The reported cases of the court of appeals, however, leave no firm
guidelines for trial judges and lawyers to follow in a criminal case when
the defendant's bad character is exposed through prosecutorial improv3. State v. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. 232, 599 P.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1979), State v. Vialpando, 93 N.M.
289, 599 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App.) cert. denied, 93 N.M. 172, 598 P.2d 215 (1979),-and State v.
Martinez, 94 N.M. 50, 607 P.2d 137 (Ct. App. 1980), discussed in Gonzales, Evidence, 11 N.M.L.
REV. 159, 163-66 (1980).
4. Martinez, 94 N.M. at 52, 607 P.2d at 139 (where an element of the crime could have been
proved by alternate means which did not implicate the defendant in prior criminality, resort to the
more volatile form of proof was considered unfairly prejudicial).
5. Vialpando, 93 N.M. at 296-97, 599 P.2d at 1093-94.
6. Gutierrez, 93 N.M. at 235, 599 P.2d at 388 (holding that, although offered by the prosecutor
for the purpose of inflaming the jury, the character evidence improperly admitted did not compel
reversal because proof of guilt was otherwise overwhelming and the error was therefore harmless).
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idence rather than malice. Two recent cases have afforded the supreme
court the opportunity to clarify the issue. Homicide prosecutions in State
v. Beach7 and State v. Saavedra' both involved the presentation of inadmissible character evidence by the prosecution against the defendant.
In each case the issue had been raised with the court in advance, and the
court admonished the prosecution that the defendant's character, that is,
his prior criminal activity, was irrelevant and not to be brought up. 9
Despite the trial judges' instructions, prosecution witnesses managed to
apprise the respective juries that the defendants were persons of bad
character. 'o
In Beach the defense claimed diminished capacity because of the defendant's use of drugs, but argued that evidence of his distribution of
drugs was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible." The court agreed,
and instructed the prosecution not to make any reference to the defendant's
distribution of drugs.' At trial the prosecution called the defendant's
former wife as a witness.' 3 She was asked whether the defendant had
used drugs.' 4 Without objection she testified that he had.' 5 She was then
asked whether he distributed drugs to other people, and she answered
that he had. 6 The court sustained a defense objection and admonished
the jury to disregard the answer.' 7 Beach was convicted. '
The defendant argued on appeal that the prejudicial effect of the evidence could not have been driven from the jury's mind by the court's
admonition. '9 In support of his argument, Beach relied on State v. Rowell, '
7. 102 N.M. 642, 699 P.2d 115 (1985). The defendant, Beach, was convicted of first degree
murder of one David Palaske. Id. at 643, 699 P.2d at 116. The evidence showed that Beach had
met Palaske in a bar, lured him out to his car, and drove him to a secluded spot. Id. The two then
engaged in an argument which culminated in Beach's shooting Palaske at close range. Id.
8. 103 N.M. 282, 705 P.2d 1133 (1985). Saavedra was convicted of felony murder and robbery.
Id. at 283, 705 P.2d at 1134. At trial he attempted to prove that the crime had been committed by
another person who had been convicted of a series of similar robberies. Id. The trial court refused
to permit proof of these other crimes. Id. On appeal the supreme court held that such proof should
have been permitted and that the trial court's ruling on that issue was reversible error. Id. at 284,
705 P.2d at 1135. The impropriety of the state's reference to Saavedra's bad character was the
second allegation of error advanced by the defendant. Id.
9. Beach, 102 N.M. at 646, 699 P.2d at 119; Saavedra, 103 N.M. at 284, 705 P.2d at 1135.
10. Id.
1i.Beach, 102 N.M. at 646, 699 P.2d at 119.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 643, 699 P.2d at 116.
19. Id. at 646, 699 P.2d at 119.
20. 77 N.M. 124,419 P.2d 966 (1966). The supreme court noted in Rowell that, "[W]e would
be deluding ourselves if we were to believe that human nature being what it is, at least some of the
jurors would not assume . . . that indeed appellant had been convicted of another forgery as stated
by the district attorney." Id. at 127, 419 P.2d at 969.
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in which the supreme court held that the prosecution's reference to a prior
felony conviction by the accused could not be cured by the trial judge's
instruction to disregard the testimony. The court rejected the argument,
holding that Rowell was limited to cases in which the offending testimony
could have "no possible place in the trial." 2 ' The opinion acknowledged
that the testimony seemed to have no relevance at the point in the trial
where it was elicited, but went on to speculate that the evidence might
later have become relevant if the defendant had attempted to show that
his threats against and confrontation with the victim had their genesis in
prior drug dealings.22 Because the evidence could have become relevant
later in the trial, the court reasoned, bad faith could not be imputed to
the prosecution.23
Four months after Beach was decided, the supreme court decided Saavedra, in which the defendant sought reversal of his murder conviction
on the ground that a prosecution witness had testified that he had known
Saavedra "[s]ince he got out of the penitentiary." 24 The trial court promptly
sustained a defense objection to the testimony and admonished the jury
to disregard it,' but declined to grant the defendant's motion for a mistrial.26
In reversing the conviction, the supreme court emphasized that the trial
judge had repeatedly cautioned both prosecution and defense attorneys
to avoid any references to the defendant's prior convictions.27 Moreover,
at the grand jury hearing, the state's witness had previously testified that
he had known the defendant since the defendant's release from prison.28
The court concluded, accordingly, that the prosecutor's failure to prepare
the witness adequately to avoid the offending reference suggested an
improper motive requiring reversal.2
Reconciliation of the two results is problematic, at best. Although both
cases were simultaneously pending before the court, they seem virtually
oblivious to each other. 30 In fact, one might conclude that the prosecutor's
conduct in Beach was more egregious than that in Saavedra. The prosecutor in Beach specifically elicited the character evidence by asking
21. Beach, 102 N.M. at646-47, 699 P.2d at119-20.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 647, 699 P.2d at 120.
24. Saavedra, 103 N.M. at284, 705 P.2d at 1135.
25. Saavedra's attorney requested that no admonition be given because such an instruction would
serve only to emphasize the offending testimony, thereby compounding its prejudicial effect. id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Justice Riordan wrote for the court in Beach, 102 N.M. 642, 699 P.2d 115 (1985); Justice
Walters wrote the court's opinion in Saavedra, 103 N.M. 282, 705 P.2d 1133 (1985). In both cases
Justices Sosa and Federici concurred. 102 N.M. at 647, 699 P.2d at 120; 103 N.M. at 286, 705
P.2d at 1137.
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whether the defendant "distributed those drugs to other people,"'" while
in Saavedra the prosecutor's question did not necessarily prompt a reference to the defendant's prison background (although the response might
reasonably have been foreseen).32 Saavedra relies heavily on the 1979
and 1980 court of appeals cases referred to above33 in which the prosecutorial misconduct test was articulated. Beach does not mention those
cases at all. It focuses instead on the notion that the stricken testimony
might have become relevant if the defendant had elected to offer evidence
that his earlier threats against the victim were prompted by his fear of
the victim.34 Thus, concluded the court, any inference of prosecutorial
misconduct was negated. 35
Both opinions acknowledge that the prosecutor's motives in offering
the evidence must be examined, but they offer little guidance as to the
implications of such motives. On one hand, Saavedra seems to regard
any improper reference by the prosecution or its witnesses to the defendant's character as grounds for a mistrial, incurable by an admonition
to the jury. On the other hand, Beach suggests that the court is willing
to countenance such references if there is any conceivable theory upon
which such evidence might become relevant later in the trial. These recent
cases cast serious uncertainty upon the proper disposition of defense
motions for mistrial where prosecution witnesses, either by design or
faulty preparation, disclose the dark side of the defendant's character.
Perhaps all that can be said in light of the supreme court's pronouncements on the subject is that the prosecution runs a serious risk of mistrial
if such references reach the jury, but such a result is by no means certain.
The emphasis placed by the courts on prosecutorial misconduct suggests
that the trial judge might question the prosecutor at the side bar to determine whether the witness's answer had been anticipated and, if so,
whether the witness had been cautioned by the attorney to confine the
answer to its proper scope. The defense, on the other hand, is well31. 102 N.M. at 646, 699 P.2d at 119.
32. 103 N.M.at 284, 705 P.2d at 1135.
33. See supra note 3.
34. Although not entirely clear from the text of the opinion itself, it appears that during a pretrial hearing on defendant's motion in limine the prosecution suggested that certain defense witnesses
might testify about the defendant's fear of Palaske. Beach, 102 N.M. at 646, 699 P.2d at 119. The
state admitted that it was unsure what the basis for such fear might have been, but that if that fear
and subsequent threats by defendant against Palaske became an issue, the state should be permitted
to show that they arose out of prior drug deals, presumably between the two of them. Id. The opinion
does not state that evidence of fear was ever offered by the defense. Ifithad offered such evidence
in its case-in-chief, then, arguably, the defense would have opened the door for the prosecution to
show the basis for the fear, including drug distribution by the defendant. In any event, the prosecution's evidence would not have been admissible in its case-in-chief; rather, it would have been
admissible, ifat all, only during the state's rebuttal.
35. Id. at 647, 699 P.2d at 121.
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advised to raise the issue by motion in limine and attempt to obtain a
ruling prohibiting any allusion to the defendant's character. Defense counsel should ask the court to advise the prosecutor to caution witnesses
about such references. At trial, defense counsel might consider approaching the bench at the beginning of the testimony of a witness who might
refer to the defendant's bad character and asking the court to rule again
for the record that such evidence will not be permitted. Such a request
will undercut a later attempt by the prosecution to attribute the witness's
character reference to inadvertence. Of course, counsel should be alert
to any character reference during the testimony so that a timely objection
and motion for mistrial might be made.
B. Proof of Other Acts or Crimes for Purposes Other than Propensity
Just as vicious dogs tend to bite and Miura bulls tend to charge, people
tend to act in conformity with their characters. 36 Generous people are
more likely to donate to charity than are misers; forgetful people are more
likely than others to leave their keys in their cars; deceitful people tend
to lie more often than truthful people. But the credence that people place
on character in making judgments about the behavior of others in everyday
life has found little acceptance in technical rules of trial practice, where
character as circumstantial evidence of behavior is largely excluded.37
Although the use of character evidence to support an inference that a
person acted in a particular way on a particular occasion is limited to the
narrow exceptions set out in N.M.R. EvID. 11-404(a),38 a person's prior
behavior might be relevant for some purpose other than to show activity
in conformity with character.39 Thus, Rule 11-404(b) permits proof of
other acts in order to show ". . . motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. "' The subtle
36. See J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES
92, 104 (1981).
37. See supra note 1.
38. In those circumstances where proof of character is permitted by the rule, the manner of proof
is controlled by Rule 405. Of the three possible techniques-opinion testimony, reputation testimony,
or testimony regarding specific instances of conduct-only opinion and reputation are permitted on
direct examination. N.M.R. EVID. 1 -405(a) (1986 Recomp.). If opinion or reputation evidence is
given on direct examination, the cross examiner may ask about specific instances of conduct. Id. If
character is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense-such as in a defamation case or in
a claim for punitive damages-then specific instances of conduct may be shown. N.M.R. EVID. II405(b) (1986 Recomp.). See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 2 § 187 at 551. See also McCarson
v. Foreman, 102 N.M. 151, 692 P.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Bazan, 90 N.M. 209, 561 P.2d
482 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347 (1977).
39. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 190 at 557, contains extensive citation to cases in which proof
of other acts is admissible for purposes other than to show conduct.
40. N.M.R. EVID. 11-404(b). In cases where character may be proved under the limited exceptions
to Rule I1-404(a), that is, where a character trait may be offered as circumstantial evidence that a
person acted in a particular way on a particular occasion, only evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation is permitted. If, on the other hand, the evidence is relevant to an issue such as motive,
opportunity, etc., under Rule I1-404(b), reference to specific instances of conduct is permitted.
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distinction between past acts as evidence of behavior and past acts as
relevant to some other purpose invariably poses a danger that the evidence
will be misused by the trier of fact. This is particularly true where the
person against whom the evidence is offered is a party to the litigation.
Thus, the trial court must assess the probative value of the evidence in
light of its potential for unfair prejudice.'
Perhaps the clearest examples of the prejudicial effect of prior behavior
testimony occur in criminal cases where the evidence is offered against
the accused.4 2 But civil cases, too, present the same opportunities for
misuse. Jaramillo v. FisherControls43 raised a host of evidentiary issues,
some of which touched on the plaintiff's character. Jaramillo was injured
in a propane gas explosion while installing a regulating device on a stove."
He claimed that the regulator was negligently manufactured. 45 At trial
Jaramillo testified about the manner in which he had installed the regulator.' The cross examination focused extensively on numerous acts of
Jaramillo's misconduct, including one misdemeanor conviction for shoplifting, and another for driving under the influence of alcohol, reckless
driving, disorderly conduct involving the use of obscene and abusive
language, and failure to obey one-way street signs.47 The court of appeals
held, in conformity with the prevailing view in New Mexico, 48 that questions about the shoplifting conviction were relevant to Jaramillo's credibility and therefore permissible. 4
Inquiry into the alcohol-related driving and disorderly conduct offenses,
however, was predicated on a different theory of admissibility: that the
evidence was relevant to the plaintiff's life expectancy and, therefore,
damages.5" The court upheld the introduction of the evidence on the
authority of De La 0 v. Bimbo's Restaurant, Inc."t In that case, the
plaintiff was injured in a fracas in the defendant's bar.52 The defendant
41. The receipt of all evidence, of course, is conditioned upon compliance with the familiar
precept embodied in N.M.R. EV[D. 11-403 (1986 Recomp.): "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
42. See supra Section I.A.
43. 102 N.M. 614, 698 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1985).
44. Id. at 617, 698 P.2d at 890.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 622, 698 P.2d at 895.
47. Id. at 622-23, 698 P.2d at 895-96.
48. State v. Day, 94 N.M. 753, 759, 617 P.2d 142, 148 (1980); State v. Melendrez, 91 N.M.
259, 572 P.2d 1267 (Ct. App. 1977). Both cases and the New Mexico courts' interpretation of the
scope of N.M.R. EvtD. 11-609(a)(2) (1986 Recomp.), which permits the introduction of convictions
of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment as impeachment, are
discussed in Norwood, Evidence, 12 N.M.L. REV. 379, 384-86 (1982).
49. Jaramillo, 102 N.M. at 622, 698 P.2d at 895.
50. Id. at 623, 698 P.2d at 896.
51. 89 N.M. 800, 558 P.2d 69 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619 (1976).
52. Id. at 802, 558 P.2d at 71.
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attempted to prove that three years after the incident the plaintiff had
engaged in drunken and abusive behavior. 3 The court ruled that these
subsequent activities did not establish that the plaintiff was habitually
drunk and abusive so as to support the inference that he was in such a
state when the fight in the bar occurred.54 De La 0 went on, however,
to discuss the relevancy of the plaintiff's behavior with respect to the
damages issue. 55 In this regard, the court found that the plaintiff's activities "were relevant to [his] life expectancy and the number of years for
which damages for permanent injury and pain and suffering should be
5
assessed ...."56 citing one New Mexico case,57 two federal cases, " and
59
two cases from other states in support of that proposition. All of those
cases involved the measure of damages in light of the injured party's
health or projected longevity. They all, however, focused on the person's
habitual or long term use of alcohol.' None of them involved an inquiry
into a single, isolated incident, as do both De La 0 and Jaramillo.
In view of the specific finding in De La 0 that the evidence of the
plaintiff's alcohol-related behavior did not amount to a habit, and the
failure of Jaramillo to even suggest that approach, it appears that the
New Mexico Court of Appeals has recognized a unique category of circumstantial proof when longevity or physical condition is an element of
damages. One isolated incident involving rowdy behavior while under
the influence of alcohol is deemed sufficiently probative of life span or
health that it outweighs any tendency it might otherwise have to impugn
the actor's character.
Based, as they are, on misplaced reliance upon cases involving habit
evidence, 6 ' both Jaramilloand its progenitor De La 0 seem ill-advised.
53. id. at 803, 558 P.2d at 72.
54. The bar owner defendant had relied on N.M.R. EvID. 11-406 (1986 Recomp.) in order to
establish the plaintiff's habit of drunken, abusive conduct, and thus to support the inference that he
had been acting in conformity with his habit when he was injured. De La 0, 89 N.M. at 803-04,
558 P.2d at 72-73. The court, however, found insufficient similarities between the later behavior
and the incident in the bar to establish habit. Id. at 804, 558 P.2d at 73.
55. Id. at 804-05, 558 P.2d at 73-74.
56. Id. at 805, 558 P.2d at 74.
57. Dollarhide v. Gunstream, 55 N.M. 353, 233 P.2d 1042 (1951).
58. Century "21" Shows v. Owens, 400 F.2d 603 (8th Cir. 1968); St. Clair v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. 279 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960).
59. Rawlings v. Andersen, 195 Neb. 686, 240 N.W.2d 568 (1976); Hansen v. Warco Steel Corp.,
237 Cal. App.2d 870, 47 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1965).
60. For example, in Dollarhide the defendant's attorney cross examined the decedent's widow
about his regular practice of drinking to excess and whether he drank "every week." 55 N.M. at
356, 233 P.2d at 1044. In Century "21 " Shows and St. Clair the courts were concerned with "drinking
habits," 400 F.2d at 610, and "personal habits" regarding "greatly excessive drinking." 279 F.2d
at 121. Again, in Hansen and Rawlings the cross examinations focused on long-term habitual conduct
rather than single incidents. 237 Cal. App.2d at 872-73, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31; 195 Neb. at 691,
240 N.W.2d at 573. On the issue of longevity and its impact on damages, the Nebraska court in
Rawlings referred to "a history with respect to the use of alcohol." 195 Neb. at 691, 240 N.W.2d
at 573 (emphasis added).
61. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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Not only do they countenance the admission of a single incident involving
alcohol, they fail to distinguish between the use of alcohol as a health
hazard in itself and the associated abusive behavior which is more tenuously related to health. Both cases admit evidence of intoxication as
well as evidence of drunken behavior without any discussion of the nexus
between those two types of activities and longevity or good health. Common experience might suggest that while a person is intoxicated, especially if engaged in violent behavior or an activity such as driving which
heightens exposure to immediate physical danger, vulnerability to injury
or even death is elevated at that time. Evidence of the person's condition
or behavior on such an occasion, however, supports no inference at all
about longevity or health at some future time unless the inference is that
the person will again engage in drunken, violent behavior and thus be
placed once again in harm's way. Such an inference, however, is based
on "propensity" evidence, which is inadmissible.6 2 The relevancy of the
habitual or long term use of alcohol seems well-established in the courts,63
but the court of appeals' decisions simply conclude, without analysis,
that an anecdotal account of such behavior has similar probative value.
II. HEARSAY
A. Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence by Child Victims of Sexual
Assault.
Recently, there has been much concern in child sexual abuse cases
regarding balancing the potential emotional trauma of putting a child on
the stand against the preservation of a defendant's right to confront witnesses. This conflict raises difficult questions regarding the admissibility
of hearsay in child sexual abuse cases. The New Mexico Court of Appeals
addressed the conflict in two cases during the survey year.64
1. Out of Court Statements by Child Victim.
In State v. Taylor, the defendant was charged with digital criminal
sexual penetration of a three-year old boy.65 At the preliminary hearing,
the magistrate found the child incompetent to testify and allowed the
parents to testify regarding statements made by the boy concerning the
incident and the identity of the perpetrator.6' Regarding the incident, the
child's exact words were that an unnamed man "stuck" fingers up the
62. See supra note I.
63. See supra notes 57-59.
64. State v. Taylor, 103 N.M. 189, 704 P.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Vigil, 103 N.M. 583,
711 P.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1985).
65. Taylor, 103 N.M. at 192, 704 P.2d at 446.
66. Id. at 193, 704 P.2d at 447. The magistrate ruled the boy incompetent to testify because his
inadequate communication skills would not allow him to testify effectively from the witness stand.
Id.
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child's "butt." 67 His story never varied.6" Regarding the identity of the
perpetrator, however, the child's statements were much more ambiguous
and confused.69 The child gave five different descriptions of the perpetrator.7 °
On appeal, one issue was whether the child's hearsay statements were
admissible, and if so, whether they nevertheless denied the defendant his
constitutional right of confrontation. 7 Although the court of appeals found
the hearsay statement regarding the event admissible, it found the hearsay
statement regarding the perpetrator's identity inadmissible and, therefore,
did not reach the confrontation issue.7
When preparing for trial, an attorney should consider as many possible
hearsay exceptions as seem applicable when offering evidence. In Taylor,
the state argued that the child's statements were admissible under two
hearsay exceptions, the residual exception and the excited utterance
67. Id. at 197, 704 P.2d at 451. The boy demonstrated the event by pointing to his anal area
with two fingers. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 198, 704 P.2d at 452.
70. Id. The child named a black man, a man dressed in various items of black color, the defendant,
the defendant and a black man, and older children. id. Although the defendant was the only person
specifically named, there was evidence that the parents discussed in the presence of the child whether
the defendant could have committed the sexual assault, thereby suggesting the defendant to the child.
Id.
7 I.
/d.at 192,704 P.2d at 446. The confrontation clauses of both the federal and state constitutions
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right .. .to be confronted with
provide: "[iln
the witnesses against him ...." U.S CONST. amend. VI; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14 (Cum. Supp.
1985). By its own terms, the confrontation clause is applicable only to criminal cases. When hearsay
is offered in a criminal case, the constitutional requirement of the right of confrontation, as well as
evidentiary requirements, must be met. State v. Martinez, 99 N.M. 48, 51, 653 P.2d 879, 882 (Ct.
App. 1982). Evidence admissible under a hearsay exception does not necessarily satisfy a defendant's
confrontational right. ld. See infra text accompanying notes 113-117 for discussion of test to meet
the constitutional requirement.
72. Taylor, 103 N.M. at 193, 704 P.2d at 447. It is not clear why the court did not address the
confrontation issue concerning the statement regarding the event.
73. Id. at 196, 704 P.2d at 450. The residual exception provides:
(X) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However,
a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or heating
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
N.M.R. EVtD. 11-803(X) (1986 Recomp.).
The court noted that the more appropriate rule would be Rule 804(b)(6) (now at 11-804(B)(6))
because it is the residual exception applicable where the declarant is unavailable, as in this case.
Taylor, 103 N.M. at 197, 704 P.2d at 451. Rule 803(24) (now at 11-803(X)) is to be utilized where
the availability of the declarant is immaterial. Id. at 196, 704 P.2d at 450. Because the rules are
identical, however, the court referred to Rule 803(24) (now at 11-803(X)). Id. at 197, 704 P.2d at
451.
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exception. 7" The state might also have offered the statements under the
exception for statements of recent perception.7 5
a. The Residual Exception.
Recognizing that a closed system of hearsay exceptions is both unrealistic and undesirable because not every contingency can be treated
by detailed rules, the residual exception" was incorporated into the exceptions to the hearsay rule. 7 The residual exception admits into evidence
probative, necessary statements when the circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness are equivalent to the recognized exceptions."
In order to determine whether the child's statements had sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness to permit admission under the residual exception, the Taylor court tested the child's two statements against the
four primary dangers of hearsay: ambiguity, lack of candor, faulty memory, and misperception. 79 The child's statement regarding the incident
passed the test.8 ' The court found that the statement regarding the event
was clear and unambiguous; 81 that the incident was probably not made
up because the boy was too young to experience detailed fantasies;82 that
it was unlikely that the boy forgot what occurred because he related the
incident the day after it happened; 3 and, finally, that because of his age
and lack of experience, it was not likely that he misperceived the event. '
The statement regarding the identity of the perpetrator, however, failed
the test.8 5 The court concluded that because the boy named five perpe74. Rule 11-803(B) provides:
(B) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.
N.M.R. EVID. 11-803(B) (1986 Recomp.).
75. Rule 11-804(B)(2) provides:
(2) Statement of recent perception. A statement, not in response to the instigation
of a person engaged in investigating, litigating or settling a claim, which narrates,
describes or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant,
made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in
which he was interested, and while his recollection was clear.
N.M.R. EVID. 11-804(B)(2) (1986 Recomp.).
76. N.M.R. EVID. 11-803(X) (1986 Recomp.). See supra note 73 for text of rule.
77. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 324. 1. One court stated, "[w]e are loathe to reduce the corpus
of hearsay rules to a straight-jacketing, hypertechnical body of semantical slogans to be mechanically
invoked regardless of the reliability of the proffered evidence." United States v. Castellana, 349
F.2d 264, 276 (2d. Cir. 1965).
78. G. LnLY, AN INTRODUCrnON TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 78 (1978). A considerable range in
degree of trustworthiness among the specific exceptions exists; therefore, the question is presented
as to which standard should be utilized with the residual exception. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at
§ 324.1. An estimated average standard appears to be assumed. Id.
79. Taylor, 103 N.M. at 197, 704 P.2d at 451.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 198, 704 P.2d at 452.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 199, 704 P.2d at 453.
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trators, all of the primary dangers of hearsay existed except for lack of
candor.6 The court found that the identification was patently ambiguous
87
and that the boy probably forgot and/or misperceived the identity.
The court noted that with regard to the event, there were corroborating
facts that were absent with regard to the identification. 88 Regarding the
event, the court focused on the fact that the child's rectum was irritated
and that the child began acting in a bizarre manner.89 On the other hand,
the court found no corroboration of the identity of the defendant as the
perpetrator other than the child's statement. 90 Because the child was at
school as well as at the defendant's home that day, a number of people
had access to him. 9'
It is not clear whether the corroborating facts were essential to the
court's holding that the statement regarding the incident was admissible,
but it is clear that the New Mexico Court of Appeals recognizes corroborating factors that tend to support the truthfulness of a declarant's
statement. 92 Contrary views claim that corroboration is irrelevant for
purposes of the residual exception. 93 In fact, it has been suggested that
corroboration may tend to undermine a claim that the hearsay is the most
probative evidence available. 94 A careful practitioner may, therefore, be
wise to present corroborating facts sufficient only to help support the
hearsay statement.
The New Mexico courts have acknowledged that the residual exceptions
should be applied more stringently in criminal rather than civil cases,
particularly in light of the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. 95 The
Taylor court reaffirmed this principle when it refused to admit the child's
statement regarding the perpetrator's identity. 96
86. Id. at 198, 704 P.2d at 452.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court stated: "[t]hus, with regard to the event, there are not only guarantees of
reliability inherent in the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, but there are also
indicia of reliability in that the event was corroborated by other facts." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court stated: "[a]bsent an outside factor, corroboration by child alone will not suffice;
there must exist an adequate indicia of reliability found in the making of the statement." Id. at 199,
704 P.2d at 453.
92. Id. at 198-99, 704 P.2d at 452-53.
93. See, e.g., Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1979). The Huff court
stated: "[Tihe probability that the statement is true, as shown by corroborative evidence, is not, we
think, a consideration relevant to its admissibility under the residual exception to the hearsay rule."
Id.
94. United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
95. State v. Barela, 97 N.M. 723, 725, 643 P.2d 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1982).
96. Taylor, 103 N.M. at 199, 704 P.2d at 453. Because of the ambiguity and confusion of the
child and the fact that the child gave five conflicting descriptions of the perpetrator, the statement
probably would not have been admitted even under the less stringent civil standard.
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b. The Excited Utterance Exception
Rule 1 1-803(B) creates an exception to the hearsay rule for a statement
relating to a startling event made by a person under a sense of excitement,
shock, or stress.97 The rationale for this exception is that the excitement
caused by an external startling event will suspend a person's capacity to
reflect and fabricate, thereby assuring that any utterance made will be
trustworthy.9 8 Additionally, because the person's memory is fresh, the
risk of lapse of memory is removed.9
There are two requirements to the excited utterance exception. First,
there must be an event or condition that excites the person.'" Second,
the person must be under the stress of excitement at the time the statement
is made.' 0 ' Taylor demonstrates the necessity for laying a proper foundation to meet this second requirement.
In Taylor, the state offered the child's statements regarding the event
and the perpetrator's identity under the excited utterance exception.' °2
Although there was a significant time lapse between the event and the
statements,' 03 the court acknowledged that "no particular amount of time
lapse will render a statement admissible or inadmissible . . . . As long
as the statement is produced by the stress of the moment, it is admissible. " "0
In determining whether the child was under stress at the time of the
declarations, the court found that no evidence was introduced that the
child was then suffering from the stress of the event.' 05 The court held
that under the facts, the requisite spontaneity and stress were not estab97. N.M.R. EVID. 11-803(B) (1986 Recomp.). See supra note 74 for text of rule.
98. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE Para. 803(2)01 (1985).
99. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 439 (1980). A criticism of this exception is
that the very nature of a spontaneous reaction may enhance the other two hearsay dangers-misstatement and misperception. Id. It has been suggested, however, that this problem need not result
in exclusion, but rather could be considered in weighing the evidence. G. LILLY, supra note 78 at
§ 61. In any case, no jurisdiction has rejected the excited utterance exception. Id.
100. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 294.
101. Id.
102. Taylor, 103 N.M. at 199, 704 P.2d at 453.
103. The child did not make the statements until the day after the incident. Id. at 200, 704 P.2d
at 454.
104. Id. at 199, 704 P.2d at 453 (quoting State v. Martinez, 102 N.M. 94, 99, 691 P.2d 887,
892 (Ct. App. 1984)).The time lapse between the event or condition and the making of the statement
is, however, an important factor. G. LILLY, supra note 78, at § 61. The longer the lapse, the greater
the chance for exclusion. Id.
In a previous case, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized that no definite time limit exists
under the excited utterance exception. State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 697, 616 P.2d 406, 410
(1980). Circumstances, more than time, determine the admissibility of the evidence. Id.
105. Taylor, 103 N.M. at 200, 704 P.2d at 454. The court found that no evidence was presented
that the boy was under stress of the event when he talked about the abuse to his babysitter, to his
parents, to various doctors, or to the detective. Id.
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lished; therefore, the excited utterance exception did not apply. "Taylor
reaffirmed the prevailing view that New Mexico courts will admit statements as excited utterances even after significant time lapses, but only
if evidence is introduced to establish that the declarant continued to be
under stress when the statements were made. 07
c. Statement of Recent Perception
The state might have attempted to enter the child's statements into
evidence under the exception to the hearsay rule for statements of recent
perception,'" especially if the state had no evidence to prove that the
child was under the stress of the excitement of the incident. The Taylor
situation appears to meet the majority of the requirements outlined in the
rule: (1) the statements were not in response to the instigation of a person
engaged in investigating, litigating, or settling a claim; (2) the event was
recently perceived by the child; and (3) the statements were most probably
made in good faith and not in contemplation of litigation. " The statement
regarding the event would also most likely pass the final requirementthat the declarant's recollection was clear. Because the child named five
perpetrators, however, an issue would probably arise regarding how clear
the child's recollection was regarding the perpetrator's identity.
Even if the state passed the hurdle of clear recollection and the court
held that the exception for statements of recent perception was applicable,
courts are nevertheless hesitant to allow such an exception in criminal
cases because of a defendant's right of confrontation. "' In State v. Maestas, ' the New Mexico Court of Appeals approved the application of the
exception for statements of recent perception in criminal cases. 2 How106. Id. In State v. Maestas, 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1978), the court also held
statements inadmissible under the excited utterance exception because no evidence was before the
court to show that the declarant was suffering from shock or stress at the time the statements were
made. Id. at 137, 584 P.2d at 185.
107. See Robinson, 94 N.M. at 697-98, 616 P.2d at 410-11.
108. N.M.R. Evto. 11-804(B)(2) (1986 Recomp.). See supra note 75 for text of rule.
109. See supra note 75 for text of rule.
110. State v. Barela, 97 N.M. 723, 725, 643 P.2d 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1982). The court in Barela
added a further reason for permitting the use of Rule I1-804(B)(2) only sparingly in criminal casesthe defendant's inability to test the reliability of the declarant's statement by cross-examination. Id.
Congress omitted the statement of recent perception exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
stating that the rule created "a new and unwarranted hearsay exception of great breadth," without
"sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify admissibility." Report of Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Federal Rules of Evidence, No. 93-650,
p. 6 (1973). In the revised Uniform Rules (1974), the statement of recent perception exception is
included only for civil cases. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at § 296.
!11. 92 N.M. 135, 584 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1978).
112. The New Mexico Supreme Court also approved this hearsay exception for use in criminal
cases. State v. Robinson, 94 N.M. 693, 616 P.2d 406 (1980). The court stated, "[rleliability, to
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ever, before hearsay will be admitted against a criminal defendant, the
evidence must pass the two-pronged test enunciated in Ohio v. Roberts."3
First, the declarant must be unavailable. 4 Because the child was declared
unavailable, Taylor meets this requirement. Second, certain indicia of
reliability or trustworthiness must be met." 5 Courts can infer reliability
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.1 6 If
not, the evidence will be excluded, unless there is a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 7
It is this second requirement that would most likely preclude the court
in Taylor from admitting the child's statement regarding the identity into
evidence. Because the exception for statements of recent perception is a
novel exception and not a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the court
would not have admitted the statements absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. Using the same analysis for trustworthiness
as it did for the residual exception, the court probably would have admitted
the statement
concerning the event, but not the identity of the perpetra8
tor. '

2. Videotaped Deposition of Child Victim.
There are a multitude of practical considerations when offering deposition evidence, especially in criminal trials. In New Mexico, the use
of a deposition in a criminal proceeding is authorized by New Mexico
support the recent perception exception to the hearsay rule, should obviate objection to admissibility
of a statement so clothed with circumstances showing veracity." Id. at 698, 616 P.2d at 411.
113. State v. Martinez, 99 N.M. 48, 51, 653 P.2d 879, 882 (Ct. App. 1982). Because Ohio v.
Roberts was decided two years after Maestas, the court in Maestas did not apply the two-part test.
114. Id. at 52, 653 P.2d at 883. The requirement that the declarant must be unavailable is relaxed
for the business records exception to the hearsay rule, N.M.R. EvD. 11-803(F) (1986 Recomp.).
Rather than proving unavailability, the attorney may establish that the unavailability requirement is
not applicable by showing that:
(I) the utility of cross-examination as to the particular records is minimal or
remote;
(2) the other evidence at trial affords defendant an adequate opportunity to test
the reliability of the records; or
(3) public policy considerations otherwise excuse the prosecution from producing the out-of-court declarant or showing his or her unavailability.
State v. Austin, 104 N.M. 573, 575-76, 725 P.2d 252, 254-55 (1985).
In Austin, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that computer printouts were not admissible
against the defendant because the state did not establish any of the above three exceptions nor did
it produce the out-of-court declarants (presumably the people who made the computerized records)
or demonstrate their unavailability. Id. at 576, 725 P.2d at 255.
115. Martinez, 99 N.M. at 52, 653 P.2d at 883.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. If the statements would have been admitted under the excited utterance exception, they
would have passed the Roberts test because it is a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 5-503(N). "' Strict compliance with the rule
is mandatory."12
New Mexico Rule of Criminal Procedure 5-504 is a specialized rule
which authorizes the use of a videotaped deposition of a child victim of
a sexual assault. 2 ' The rationale for this rule is to protect children who
emohave allegedly been sexually assaulted
122 from suffering the further
tional trauma of in-court testimony.
119. Rule 5-503(N) provides in pertinent part:
(N) Use of depositions. At the trial, or at any hearing, any part or all of a
deposition may be used as evidence if:
(1) the witness is unavailable, as unavailability is defined in Paragraph (A)
of Rule 11-804 of the Rules of Evidence;
(2) the witness gives testimony at the trial or hearing inconsistent with his
deposition; or
(3) it is otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence.
N.M.R. CRIM. P. 5-503(N) (1986 Recomp.)
Rule 5-503(N) was amended in 1981 to make the rule consistent with Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and to clarify the relationship between the New Mexico Rules of
Evidence and the New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizing the use of depositions in
criminal trials. N.M.R. CRIM. P. 5-503 annot.
The amendment to Rule 5-503(N) authorizes the admissibility of a deposition if it is admissible
under the Rules of Evidence. Prior to the amendment, the rule defined unavailability different from
the Rules of Evidence such that it was possible for a deposition to be admissible under N.M.R.
EVID. 11-804(B)(1) but inadmissible under Rule 5-503. See McGuinness v. State, 92 N.M. 441,
444, 589 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1979).
120. McGuinness, 92 N.M. at 442, 589 P.2d at 1033 (1979).
121. Rule 5-504 provides in pertinent part:
(A) Upon motion, and after notice to opposing counsel, at any time after the
filing of the indictment, information or complaint in district court charging a
criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact on a child under thirteen
(13) years of age, the district court may order the taking of a videotaped
deposition of the victim, upon a showing that the child may be unable to testify
without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm. The
district judge must attend any deposition taken pursuant to this paragraph and
shall provide such protection of the child as the judge deems necessary.
(B) At the trial of a defendant . . . any part or all of the videotaped deposition
... may be . . . admitted as evidence as an additional exception to the hearsay
rule of the Rules of Evidence if:
(I) the child is unable to testify before the court without suffering unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm;
(2) the deposition was presided over by a district judge and the defendant
was present and was represented by counsel or waived counsel; and
(3) the defendant was given an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the
child, subject to such protection of the child as the judge deems necessary.
N.M.R. CRIM. P. 5-504 (1986 Recomp.)
Rule 5-503(N) authorizes the use of a deposition if "it is otherwise admissible under the Rules
of Evidence." N.M.R. EVID. 11-804(B)(1) authorizes the use of a deposition if the party against
whom the testimony is offered had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
cross-examination. Rule I1-804(B)(1), therefore, appears to cover the situation addressed in Rule
5-504, and it seems that Rule 5-504 would be an unnecessary rule except for the provision that the
judge must be present at the deposition and provide protection of the child as is necessary. The
commentary accompanying the rule does not discuss why a new rule was necessary rather than using
Rule 11-804(B)(1) to cover the situation.
122. State v. Vigil, 103 N.M. 583, 585, 711 P.2d 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1985).
Rule 5-504 implements the statutory protections afforded by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17, which
provides in pertinent part:
A. In any prosecution for criminal sexual penetration or criminal sexual contact
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In State v. Vigil, 23 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the

videotaped deposition of a child sexual assault victim was admissible. In
Vigil, the defendant was tried on three counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor girl. 24
' The trial court admitted the videotaped deposition
of the child based on the testimony of the clinical psychologist who had
been treating the child regularly.'25 The psychologist testified that the
child cried frequently, experienced nightmares, was frequently ill, and
often missed school. 126 In the psychologist's opinion, testifying before a
jury would be a frightening experience for the child, would undermine
the child's progress, and would be an unreasonable imposition.' 27
On appeal, the defendant argued that the use of the videotaped deposition violated both the standards set out in the rule and his constitutional
right of confrontation. 28 Regarding the violation of standards, the defendant contended that the state failed to introduce substantial evidence
to support the court's finding that the child would suffer unreasonable
emotional harm if required to testify in court. 129 In response, the court
of appeals utilized the substantial evidence test'3° and concluded that the
psychologist's testimony clearly qualified as substantial
evidence and the
3
standards of the rule were therefore satisfied.' '
of a minor, upon motion of the district attorney and after notice to the opposing
counsel, the district court may, for a good cause shown, order the taking of a
videotaped deposition of any alleged victim under the age of sixteen years.
The videotaped deposition shall be taken before the judge in chambers in the
presence of the district attorney, the defendant and his attorneys. Examination
and cross-examination of the alleged victim shall proceed at the taking of the
videotaped deposition in the same manner as permitted at trial under the provisions of Rule 611 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence. Any videotaped
deposition taken under the provisions of this act [this section] shall be viewed
and heard at the trial and entered into the record in lieu of the direct testimony
of the alleged victim.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1978).
123. 103 N.M. 583, 711 P.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1985).
124. Id. at 584, 771 P.2d at 29. The jury reached a guilty verdict on two counts but was unable
to reach a unanimous decision as to the third count; therefore, a mistrial as to that count was declared.
Id.
125. Id. at 585, 771 P.2d at 30.
126. Id.
127. Id. The psychologist concluded that the child could tolerate a videotaped deposition because
it was less traumatic. Id.
128. Id. at 584, 771 P.2d at 29.
129. Id. at 586, 771 P.2d at 31.
130. Id. The court enumerated the following rules for the substantial evidence test:
(I) that substanial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
(2) that on appeal, all disputed facts are resolved in favor of the successful
party, with all reasonable inferences indulged in support of the finding, and all
evidence and inferences to the contrary discarded; and
(3) that although contrary evidence is presented which may have supported a
different verdict, the appellate court will not weigh the evidence or foreclose
a finding of substantial evidence.
Id.
131. Id. It is troubling that the court applied the substantial evidence test by simply enumerating
the rules and promptly concluding that the state met the test without applying the facts to the rules.
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The Vigil court further rejected the defendant's contention that the use
of the videotaped deposition violated his confrontation right. 32 The court
noted that generally a defendant has the right to confront his accusers at
trial, but that this general rule of law "must occasionally give way to
considerations of public policy."' 33 The court balanced the defendant's
right of confrontation against the strong public policy of protecting child
victims of sexual assaults.' 34 The court noted that the videotaped deposition rule satisfies the primary interest secured by the confrontation rightcross examination-by specifically providing that the defendant be afforded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness. ' In Vigil,
the defendant never argued that he was deprived of his fight to crossexamination.' 36 Weighing the above factors, the court concluded that the
defendant's right of confrontation was not violated. '
Vigil suggests to the practicing attorney that the testimony of the psychologist treating the sexually assaulted child indicating that the child
would suffer unreasonable emotional trauma if required to testify in court
will be sufficient evidence to uphold the use of Rule 5-504. Furthermore,
if the standards of Rule 5-504 are satisfied, the confrontational right
defense will not succeed.
B. Admissibility of Deposition of Witness Greater Than 100 Miles
from Trial.
The hearsay rule establishes a distinct preference for live, in-court
testimony; consequently, deposition testimony is ordinarily allowed only
when the witness is unavailable to testify in person.' 38 The conditions
imposed by New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 1-032(A)(3)' 39 on the
132. Id. at 587, 771 P.2d at 32.
133. Id. at 586, 771 P.2d at 31 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)).
134. Id.
135. Id. The cross examination is subject to such protection as the court deems appropriate. Id.
The court also noted that the jury had an adequate opportunity to observe the child's demeanor while
she testified via the videotape. id. at 587, 771 P.2d at 32.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Salsman v. Witt, 466 F.2d 76 (10th Cir. 1972). Judge Learned Hand stated: "[tihe deposition
has always been, and still is, treated as a substitute, a second-best, not to be used when the original
is at hand." Napier v. Bossard, 102 F.2d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1939).
139. Rule 1-032(A)(3) provides:
(3) the deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any
party for any purpose if the court finds: (a) that the witness is dead; or (b) that
the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or
hearing, or out of the United States, unless it appears that the absence of the
witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (c) that the witness
is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity or imprisonment;
or (d) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (e) upon application and notice, that
such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of
justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
N.M.R. Civ. P. 1-032(A)(3) (1986 Recomp.).
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use of depositions in court proceedings illustrate that there has been no
change in the established principle."
A recent New Mexico Court of Appeals case helped to clarify the rule
that a deposition may be used if the witness is at a greater distance than
100 miles from the place of trial or hearing.' 4' In Dial v. Dial, the mother
of two teenage sons filed a contempt motion when the father failed to
return the sons from Texas to New Mexico after the school year ended. 42
'
The father took depositions of the children in Texas and offered the
depositions in evidence at the contempt hearing. 143 The trial judge refused
to admit the depositions, finding that the father failed to lay a proper
' 44
foundation that the children were more than 100 miles from the court.
The trial court ruled that the fact that the depositions were taken nine
days earlier, reflecting that both children were then in Texas, was insufficient to establish where the children were at the actual time of the
hearing. ' Additionally, the court rejected the sworn testimony of a witness attorney who called Texas during a recess at the hearing to verify
that the children were in Texas because the witness did not talk directly
with the children. "4The father was held in contempt and ordered jailed
147
until the children were returned to New Mexico.
On appeal, the father argued that the refusal to admit the children's
depositions in evidence was error. 48 The New Mexico Court of Appeals
agreed with the father, holding that it was improper for the trial court to
exclude the use of the deposition testimony. 141 In reaching its decision,
the court of appeals addressed two issues regarding what constituted a
proper foundation to satisfy the requirement that the witness be more than
100 miles from the court. 150
The first issue concerned the proper foundation for showing that the
actual distance was greater than 100 miles from the court proceeding.''
The court of appeals noted that the trial court could take judicial notice
that the distance between Austin, Texas, and Santa Fe, New Mexico,
was greater than 100 miles, thereby relieving the proponent of the deposition testimony of the necessity of proving the actual distance.' 52
140. Salsman, 466 F.2d at 79.
141. Dial v. Dial, 103 N.M. 133, 703 P.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1985).
142. Id.at 135, 703 P.2d at 912.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.at 134, 703 P.2d at 911.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Because this was a case of first impression in New Mexico, the court looked to federal law.
Id. at 136, 703 P.2d at 913.
151. Id.
152. Id. To support its conclusion, the court cited Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.
1970), where the court held that the trial court could take judicial notice that Madisonville, Kentucky,
was more than 100 miles from Terre Haute, Indiana. Id.
If a court does not take judicial notice of the distance, the method for measuring the distance of
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The more significant issue, however, was whether the proximity of the
witness to the place of trial was to be determined as of the time the
deposition was offered or some earlier time.' 53 The court of appeals
rejected the trial court's interpretation of the rule that a showing must be
made that the children were more than 100 miles away at the actual time
' Rather, the court of appeals held that in the absence of
of the hearing. 54
evidence to the contrary, a showing that the children resided beyond 100
miles at some "recent earlier time" was sufficient to permit admission
'
of the depositions. 55
The court of appeals did not provide firm guidelines for what constitutes
a "recent earlier time." In Dial, the children's depositions were taken in
Texas nine days prior to the hearing.' 5 6 The court, however, cited one
case where the showing was that the witness was at the required distance
approximately seven months before trial' 57 and another case where the
deposition witness was at the required distance eight months before the
trial. 58
It seems apparent, therefore, that the New Mexico courts will permit
some leeway when showing that the witness is beyond the 100-mile
requirement. Exactly how much leeway the courts will allow will probably
depend on the facts of each case.
CONCLUSION
Although the survey year produced little that might be characterized
as major changes of direction in New Mexico evidence law, numerous
cases presented the appellate courts with opportunities to assess and refine
existing doctrine. The cases selected for inclusion in this survey represent
a sampling of recent opinions thought to have practical significance to
the trial bar.
the witness from the place of trial varies. Some courts have held that the proper method is to measure
the distance along a straight line. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D 16 (D.C. Conn.
1977). The rationale for utilizing this method, as opposed to measuring the ordinary, usual, and
shortest routes of travel, is to avoid trivial disputes as to which actually are the ordinary, usual, and
shortest routes. Id. One court held that the proper method was to be based on the shortest railroad
route between the two points in question. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 337 F. Supp.
546 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The court noted that this method is used by jury commissioners in calculating
mileage for jury fees. Id.
153. Dial, 103 N.M. at 136, 703 P.2d at 913.
154. Id. There are cases that support the trial court's interpretation. See, e.g., Mark IV Properties,
Inc. v. Club Dev. & Management Corp., 12 B.R. 854 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981) (where the court
held that the proximity of witnesses deposed to the court was to be determined at the time their
depositions were offered into evidence).
Other cases have held that the time at which a witness's location may be examined is at the time
the deposition is offered or a time during the proponent's case when a trial subpoena could be served.
See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D 16 (D.C. Conn. 1977).
155. Dial, 103 N.M. at 136, 703 P.2d at 913. The court noted that no contrary evidence was
presented. Id. at 135, 703 P.2d at 912.
156. Id.
157. Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
158. Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1970).

